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:^\ of the evidence.

Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co..
973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IV.

The trial court erred in failing to award Knighton lost-rent damages.

The trial court's decision to not award damages will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Lysenkov.Sawaya. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 31, fl 6, 973 P.2d 445.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain to
this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the
body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 20,2000, Knighton filed a Complaint against Bowers alleging
breach of a real property purchase agreement (the "Agreement") between Knighton
and Bowers regarding certain real property, seeking specific performance of the
Agreement, including conveyance of good and clear title to the real property to
Knighton, or in the alternative, judgment for damages against Bowers caused by
Bowers' breach of the Agreement. On December 15,2000, Bowers filed an Answer
and Counterclaim against Knighton alleging Knighton's breach of the Agreement,
and illegal placement of a Notice of Interest on the subject real property.
On February 20, 2001, Knighton filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
against Bowers. On March 1, 2001, Bowers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
against Knighton. On April 30, 2001, the trial court denied both Motions for
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Summary Judgment, holding that the Agreement was ambiguw.
admission of extrinsic evidence

-

e
Bowers in

< Mi December 4, 2002, the trial court held a bench
trial. At the end of the bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of
Knighton and against Bowers, awarding Knighton damages
specific performance

;

nrt further held that Defendant

< In I mil I in11 rlo.ir title to the subject real property as of the date of trial. On
January 21, 2003, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusion::
Law and Judgment in favor ol l-'Luiilill m II n imiii iii.il mi
>;

;

hi ill $ III I'!!-' ??> plus

ihton filed a Notice of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties entered into an agreement on December
"Agreement"), whereby Defendant/Appellee Vickey A. Bowers ("Bowers") agreed
to sell and Plaintiff/Appellant Kerry L. Knighton ("Knighton") agreed to purchase real
property in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more particularly described as .
the Kopperview Mobile Home I'jih Jjuhiln'M
ciihililniii. mi IIMI

| ci 1 , 'fsul'i^rM

|,ilighton's due diligence. (R. , ., .. .„ . i, Trial Ex. No. 2.)

Knighton learned of Bowers' desire to sell the Property because Bowers had
advertised the Property for sale in The Salt Lai\ti mm..-,-

E:\UurieVKnighton\AppellateBrief.wpd

When Bowers and Knighton entered into the Agreement, the Property was
unimproved and not ready for a mobile home to be used on the Property. (T. 6263.)
The terms of the Agreement included a purchase price for the Property of
$15,000, with a down payment and deferred payments payable from Knighton to
Bowers. (R. 77; T. 11,15; Trial Ex. No. 2.) The parties agreed that Knighton would
pay Bowers $200.00 per month which would be applied to the purchase price of the
Property and would be forfeited only if Knighton subsequently decided not to buy
the Property. (R. 77; T. 15,46; Trial Ex. No. 2.) In signing the Agreement, Bowers
represented that she had clear title to the Property. (R. 77; T. 11-12; Trial Ex. No.
2.) Bowers did not, in fact, have clear title to the Property, but she should have
known that she did not have clear title before entering into the Agreement based
upon the deed that she had received regarding the Property. (R. 77; T. 12,173-74;
Trial Ex. No. 2.)
The parties entered into a subsequent agreement on April 19, 1996 (the
"Extension Agreement"), which was entered into after Knighton discovered
problems with Bowers' title and after he informed Bowers of those problems,
specifically the existence of two trust deeds and one Certificate of Non-Compliance.
(R. 79; T. 16-17; Trial Ex. Nos. 4-7.) These were the only title problems raised by
Knighton. (T. 16-17.) The Extension Agreement was executed as an extension of
the Agreement, adding that closing would be within thirty (30) days of Bowers
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clearing title, in anticipation that the liens would be remuvuil will in i .1 i.lmrl linn1 (K.
/y; I
1

m, Trial Ex No 1 1 i i i r . i «ii.'ii!,nm / U I H V I I H I I I ,IIM> <• >,prosslv permitted
i'ii in inovp I111 ni"hil" home to the Property. (R. 79; T. 21,114-15; Trial Ex.

Knighton originally intended to live >•
r

changed

. 80-81

April of

1996, Knighton moved a mobile home he owned onto the Property. (T 73, 11819.) Knighton sold the mobile home to a third party to whom he was intending to
lease the Property, and maae imp

> su m il i iimbili

i imili in |iL)i cii mi ihi Pmpt-Ttv «ind be occupied in compliance with regulatory
statutes. (T. 90, 92.) During 1996, Knighton improved the Property by obtaining
a survey, obtaining a building permit, arranging
vehicles l»v in&ldlliiiu .1 u)m n'lc I M I I mslalhiKi sow(M U ilur and electrical hookups
mi a mobile home, installing steps for a mobile home, and installing fenceposts.
(1. 74-79, 1<

108.) In April 1996, Knighton rented the Property to

party for $200 a mo

January i il

1997, the third party moved the mobile home she had purchased from Knighton
from the Property because of the delay in Knighton obtaining title to the Property.
(T. 92.)
"P" 1 ii"ii«, mil i "rtificate of Non-Compliance were not timely removed by
Bowers as anticipated in April 1996. (R. 25; T. 26-27.) By December 1996,
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Knighton was concerned about the money he had been paying to Bowers with the
risk of never getting the Property and unilaterally stopped paying Bowers directly,
and instead paid the $200 monthly payment into an escrow account. (R. 25; T. 8586.) Bowers was notified of but did not object to this procedure. (T. 30-31.) The
trial court held that it was reasonable for Knighton to protect himself from Bowers'
breach by placing the money in escrow until such time as clear title could be
provided. (T. 176.)
Following December 1996, the Property was scheduled for a trustee's sale
by the trust deed holder of the Property. (This was part of Knighton's previous
concern regarding title.) (T. 29; Trial Ex. Nos. 15-18.) On February 11, 1998,
Bowers paid $4,899.50 to save the Property from the trustee's sale and to obtain
a release of the two trust deeds. (R. 60; T. 31; Trial Ex. No. 20.) After paying the
money to obtain the release of the trust deeds, Bowers decided she had too much
time and money invested into the Property to sell it to Knighton for the agreed sales
price of $15,000.00. (R. 58-61; T. 32, 36-38.) In addition, Bowers paid off the lien
in favor of Salt Lake County represented by the Certificate of Non-Compliance. (R.
60; T. 34-35.)

Notwithstanding repeated requests to close the purchase by

Knighton, Bowers refused to close. (T. 40-42.)
In November of 1999, after Bowers had notified Knighton that she no longer
wished to sell the Property to him, she moved her own mobile home onto the
Property. (R. 58; T. 4 1 , 147.) Bowers had been paying $360 per month for lot
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rental where her mobile home had previously been located (I 'II ) M i n i h .vpd
her mobile home to the Property beu-uisr she wi mill im IDIHH T Inve to pay the rent
!

n November 20, 2000, Knighton filed the Complaint

against Bowers in this action seeking (i) specific performance of the Agreement as
modified by the Extension Agreement; and (ii) in the alternative il,im<K|i-s ll 1 I I t
uecembe:

Answer and Counterclaim against

i i .II seeking removal of Knighton's Notice of Interest recorded on the Property
plus damages. (R. 5-10.) r
Summary Judgment.
MINIMI

iiy IIII|I||IIHIII

February 14, 2001, Knighton filed a Motion

.

> Motion W

36-105.) On April 30, 2001, the trial court denied both

Motions for Summary Judgment, ruling that genuine issues of fact regarding the
ambiguities contained in the Agreement and the Extension Agret
a trial to Ini.ii e/In

nlniM i I M ' L intent of Knighton and Bowers in entering

into the Agreement and Extension Agreement. (R. 173-78.)
On December 4, 2002, the trial court held a bench trial in IIi
213-1

Januaiy ' i , 'inn,

m ,i

i

|r| ih,n the Agreement is

legally binding between the parties; Bowers did not timely release the liens on the
Property to obtain clear title; it was reasonable for Knighton to pay installment
payments into an escrow account when bow
alioriwv wnU ,i k'Hn In I' iiirjlilwii stating that Knighton had not performed under the
Agreement, which was not true; Bowers did not advise Knighton of the release of
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the defects in the title of the Property; Knighton was justified in not preparing closing
papers as Bowers was not prepared to close; there is nothing unique about the
Property; and entered judgment awarding Knighton damages but denying specific
performance ofthe Agreement and lost-rent damages. (R. 222-27; T. 171-85.) The
trial court further held that Bowers did not have clear title to the Property at the time
of trial. (R. 222-27; T. 178,181.) On February 19, 2003, Knighton filed the Notice
of Appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Knighton specific performance of the
Agreement.

Because the Property is real property, it is unique and specific

performance of the Agreement is the appropriate remedy for Bowers' breach.
Evidence at trial was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of uniqueness of the
Property. Bowers' decision that she had entered into a bad bargain, and therefore
refused to close the sale ofthe Property, is not sufficient reason to deny Knighton
specific performance as a remedy in this matter. Knighton fully performed under
the Agreement and therefore does not have "unclean hands" as defined by Utah
case law. The trial court erred in holding that Bowers did not have clear title to the
Property at the time of trial because only three defects in the title of the Property
were introduced into evidence at the time of trial and all three defects were cured
by Bowers prior to trial. In addition to specific performance, Knighton is entitled to
his lost-rent damages arising from Bowers' breach ofthe Agreement. Alternatively,
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should this Court deny Knighton specific performance, judgment in favor of
Knighton should be augmented by lost-rent damages to place Knighton in as good
a position as if the Agreement had been performed by Bowers.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING KNIGHTON SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT.
The trial court erred in its determination to award Knighton damages rather

than the remedy of specific performance of the Agreement. The trial court ruled that
specific performance is not preferred over monetary damages if monetary damages
are sufficient, the Property is not unique, and that Knighton had unclean hands
because rather than continue to make payments under the Agreement in December
of 1996 he could have declared breach of the Agreement and demanded refund of
prior payments to Bowers. (R. 222-27; T. 179-81; Addendum "A" attached hereto.)
A trial court's denial of specific performance is a discretionary ruling that is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Morris v. Sykes. 624 P.2d 681,
681 (Utah 1981). "Specific performance is an equitable remedy, and accordingly,
the trial court is granted wide discretion in applying and formulating it." LHIW. Inc.
v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961,963 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has stated
as follows regarding the denial of specific performance and its standard of review
on appeal:
We decide as we do herein in awareness that, inasmuch as specific
performance is an equitable remedy, the trial judge has considerable
discretion in determining whether equity in good conscience required
E:\Laurie\Knighton\AppellateBrief.wpcJ
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that relief be granted. But it is equally true that when the trial court has
based his ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law.
where a correct one may have produced a different result, the party
adversely affected thereby is entitled to have the error rectified in a
proper adjudication under correct principles of law.
Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently followed the general rule that the
right to "an equitable remedy is an exceptional one and absent statutory mandate,
equitable relief shall be granted only when a court determines that damages are
inadequate and that equitable relief would result in more perfect and complete
justice." Jenkins v. Percival. 962 P.2d 796, 804 (1998).
A.

Because the Property is Real Property, it is Unique and Specific
Performance is the Appropriate Remedy.
Because the Property is real property, it is therefore unique and the remedy

that should be awarded to Knighton is specific performance. The Utah Supreme
Court has held that in the context of a buyer enforcing a purchase agreement for
real property, the "rule has been long established that a vendee has a right to insist
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able to perform."
Castagno v. Church. 552 P.2d 1282,1284 (Utah 1976).
Such a right to specific performance by a buyer of real property is due to the
uniqueness of real property. Perron v. Hale. 108 Idaho 578, 701 P.2d 198, 202
(1985). The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the general common law regarding
the remedy of specific performance in the context of real estate purchase
agreements as follows:
E:\Laurie\Knighton\AppellateBrief.wpd
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The general rules of the common law are that: (1) a party is entitled to
the equitable remedy of specific performance when damages, the legal
remedy, are inadequate; (2) because of the perceived uniqueness of
land, it is presumed that damages are inadequate in an action for
breach of a land sale contract, and the nonbreaching party need not
make a separate showing of the inadequacy of the damages: (3) the
remedy is equally available to both vendors and purchasers; and (4)
additionally, the appropriateness of specific performance as relief in a
particular case lies within the discretion of the trial court.
i d (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld a purchaser's claim to the
remedy of specific performance regarding real property purchase agreements, even
if there are defects in the title of the subject real property. If there is a defect in the
real property that the seller was aware of, but the buyer was not, the appropriate
remedy is specific performance of the purchase agreement "with an abatement in
the purchase price equal to the value of the deficiency or defect." Castagno at
1284. Even if the defect in the real property is a defect in title, the appropriate
remedy is still specific performance, because to hold contrary would allow a seller
to breach a purchase agreement without consequence; "[n]ot only would a seller
have no motivation to clear title, but the cost of clearing title would be shifted to a
buyer determined to purchase the property." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp..
846 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court further held that
"[sjpecific performance with an abatement in the purchase price has long been
recognized as an appropriate remedy when a seller refuses to convey." ig\
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The trial court held that Knighton "is entitled to recover from the defendant's
failure to get clear title." (T. 179.) The court then posed the question of what
Knighton ought to recover. (T. 179.) The court stated the general rule that "if the
court can grant an adequate remedy at law, it should not resort to equity." (T. 17980.) The court then reasoned that the Property is not "unique" to Knighton because
it is a mobile home lot that is "not all that special." (T. 180.) The trial court also
noted that the Property was the residence of Bowers at the time of trial. (T. 180.)
The trial court's reasoning that the Property is not unique because it is a
mobile home lot that is "not all that special" is not sufficient to rebut the presumption
that each piece of real property is unique. Merely because a piece of real property
is not of seemingly high value, or is a lot among other similar lots, its uniqueness
as real property is not defeated. Such reasoning is insufficient to deny Knighton
specific performance which is the appropriate remedy when a seller breaches a real
property purchase agreement.
This situation is akin to that of Dean v. Gregg. 34 Wash. App. 684, 663 P.2d
502(1983). (See Addendum "B" attached hereto.) In Dean, the Washington Court
of Appeals reversed a trial court's refusal to grant a purchaser specific performance
of a real property purchase agreement. lg\ at 503. The seller refused to sell the
subject real property because "costs started mounting up" after the agreement was
signed. la\ at 502. The seller had to survey the subject property and due to the
survey costs, the seller would not make as much money selling the subject property
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as he had originally thought. ]a\ at 502. The court held that seller's decision to
enter into a bad bargain does not defeat specific performance as a remedy for the
buyer, id, at 503. The court reasoned that failing to sell a piece of real property
because too much has been spent in preparing the property for sale "[i]n the
absence of fraud (and none is charged in this case), that is not a sufficient reason
to deny specific performance." id. In the case at hand, Bowers similarly testified
that "I did not intend on selling it to [Knighton] for the original $15,000 once I started
having to put money into it." (T. 32.) Bowers further testified "I put so much money
into it paying taxes and - yes, I changed my mind. I didn't want to sell it for the
price I quoted [Knighton]." As in Dean. Bowers' decision that the Agreement was
a bad bargain is not sufficient to deny Knighton specific performance as a remedy
in this matter.
As a matter of public policy, the ruling of the trial court would question the
enforceability of any real property purchase agreement regarding the purchase of
a lot in a mobile home park or, for that matter, a lot in any subdivision where such
lots are seemingly inexpensive or there are numerous other lots in the same
subdivision of a similar nature. When Knighton entered into the Agreement with
Bowers, he intended to live on the Property and make it his primary residence,
which evidences the uniqueness of the Property to Knighton. (T. 80-81.)
The fact that Bowers used the Property as a personal residence at the time
of trial should not result in a denial of specific performance of the Agreement. At

E:\LaurieVKnighton\AppellateBrief.wpd
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the time Bowers entered into the Agreement, the Property was unimproved and not
the residence of Bowers. (R. 58; T. 62-63.) In fact, Knighton intended to live on the
Property when he entered into the Agreement. (T. 80-81.) After Bowers decided
that she would not sell the Property to Knighton, she moved her mobile home onto
the Property and it then became her personal residence in November of 1999. (R.
58; T. 41,147.) Bowers was only able to move her mobile home onto the Property
because Knighton had performed numerous improvements to the Property,
including obtaining a building permit, pouring a concrete slab for off-street parking
of two vehicles, installing sewer, water and electrical hookups at the Property for a
mobile home, installing steps for a mobile home on the Property, and installing
fenceposts. (T. 74-79,103,106,108.) The Property became Bowers' residence
after Bowers breached the Agreement with Knighton by deciding not to sell the
Property to Knighton. Bowers benefitted from Knighton's improvements to the
Property and should not benefit from the Property being her residence at the time
of trial because that was only possible due to her breach of the Agreement.
B.

Knighton did not Have "Unclean Hands" as Defined in Utah Law.
Knighton did not have "unclean hands" as defined by Utah case law. A party

seeking specific performance must do so with clean hands. DeLorean at 963. The
Utah Supreme Court has defined someone without clean hands as someone "who
is unable or unwilling to perform." Jd A party seeking specific performance "must
have clean hands in having done equity himself... [t]hat is, he must take care to
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discharge his own duties under the contract; and he cannot rely on any mere
inconvenience as an excuse for his failure to do so." Fischer v. Johnson. 525 P.2d
45,46 (Utah 1974) (where plaintiff failed to tender $3,000 payment prerequisite to
entering into the contract of sale, denial of specific performance was upheld on
appeal). This Court has held that a buyer failing to obtain a loan required by the
Agreement, failing to communicate with seller during the course of the construction
of a home on the subject property, and failure to visit and inspect progress of
construction were indicative that the plaintiff buyer did not have clean hands and
specific performance was correctly denied him. Carry. Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d
1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has further ruled that "[although the clean hands
doctrine states a fundamental principle of equity juris prudence, this principle is not,
in its application, so much an absolute rule to be followed by the courts as it is a
guide for determining whether in a suit between two or more wrongdoers relief
should be granted." Park v. Jamison. 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1961).
In so ruling, the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated that there are many
"qualifications and exceptions" to the clean hands doctrine, including "granting relief
to an alleged wrongdoer having considered the fact that no injuries resulted from
his acts or omissions." idL
In the case at hand, the trial court held that Knighton had effectively tendered
performance under the Agreement. (R. 222-29; T. 176.) In December of 1996,
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Knighton became concerned that Bowers would ever perform under the Agreement
and deliver good title to the Property. (T. 176.) Knighton therefore began paying
the $200 monthly payments into an escrow account. (T. 176.) The trial court
approved of Knighton's actions, stating from the bench that "it was reasonable for
Mr. Knighton to do that... [h]e was entitled to protect - protect the money that he
was paying." (T. 176.) The court further ruled that "because Ms. Bowers in this
matter could not deliver clear title, there was never any need on the part of Mr.
Knighton to pay the down payment, never any need to have any final closing
papers." (T. 178.)
The trial court went on to rule that because Knighton sufficiently aware that
Bowers may never close the sale of the Property to Knighton in December of 1996,
he was not entitled to specific performance. The trial court stated in its ruling:
At that point in time, he easily could have declared breach and
demanded his money back and gone on with life. But he chose not to
do that for reasons I've already talked about. And that's fine. But to
get equity, you've got to do equity and I can't say here that the plaintiff
comes to this - comes to this court seeking equity with clean hands.
And that, of course, is required before I can grant equity.
(T. 180.)
Such ruling by the court is a misinterpretation of the clean hands doctrine set
forth in Utah law. The trial court specifically held that Knighton performed under the
Agreement and need not have prepared final closing papers due to Bowers' refusal
to close. (T.176-78.) Failing to demand monetary damages earlier in time rather
than pursuing specific performance of a real property purchase agreement does not
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equate to having "unclean hands." The trial court holding punishes Knighton for
failing to rush to the remedy of the court system rather than trying to resolve his
dispute with Bowers through other means prior to commencement of litigation. After
December of 1996, not only did Knighton continue to make payments of $200 into
an escrow account, he engaged in significant communications with Bowers and her
attorney, and attempted to close the Property on numerous occasions. (R. 25-26,
119-20; T. 72-74, 83; Trial Ex. Nos. 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26.) In fact, on
December 21,1997, a full year after the date the trial court ruled Knighton should
have declared breach, Bowers, through her counsel, indicated that she was still
willing to sell the Property to Knighton. (Trial Ex. No. 19; See Addendum "C"
attached hereto.) In addition, in December of 1996, Knighton had made significant
improvements to the Property and his mobile home was located on the Property.
(T. 74-79,103,106,108,120.) There is no "wrongdoing" or failure to perform on
Knighton's part in this matter, but rather an ongoing interest in the Property and
attempts to force the closing of the purchase.
Knighton did everything within his power to complete the purchase of the real
property and further testified at trial that he was willing to accept the Property with
any defects in title that still might exist, although the record is clear that of the three
exceptions he complained of, all three were cured. (T.88-89.) The trial court's
ruling that the Property is not unique because it is merely a mobile home lot, it is
Bower's residence, and Knighton did not seek to enforce his rights to specific
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performance under the Agreement earlier in time is a misapplication of the law of
the State of Utah as to be an abuse of discretion and should be overturned by this
Court.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BOWERS DID NOT
HAVE CLEAR TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.
The trial court erred in holding that Bowers did not have clear title to the

Property at the time of trial because all defects to the title of the Property objected
to by Knighton were satisfied prior to trial and there was no evidence at trial by
either party that any other defects to the title of the Property existed. A trial court's
finding of facts are clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah
1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998).
In order to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of
the evidence, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the
findings."

Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993).

In

marshaling the evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon
v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). After constructing this array of
competent evidence, the challenging party "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence . . . sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Following is the marshaled evidence regarding title to the Property. Only the
parties testified in this matter. Bowers testified at the time the Agreement was
entered into, she was attempting to obtain clear title from the previous owners,
though she had already received a deed to the Property. (R. 56-57; T. 11.) The
warranty deed received by Bowers noted that there was an outstanding trust deed
and note on the Property, though Bowers did not realize it at the time she received
the warranty deed. (T. 12; Trial Ex. No. 8.) On March 21,1996, the previous owner
issued a quit claim deed to Bowers clearing the title problem. (T. 22-26; Trial Ex.
No. 28.) Bowers further testified that a trust deed in favor of Paul Frampton, a trust
deed in favor of AMTRA, Inc., and a Salt Lake County Certificate of NonCompliance recorded on the Property were the three defects in title that concerned
Knighton. (T. 26-27; Trial Ex. Nos. 5-7.) Bowers testified that she paid Frampton
$4,899.50 to obtain a release of the two trust deeds to prevent the Property from
being sold at a trustee's sale scheduled for February of 1998. (R. 60; T. 30-31;
Trial Ex. Nos. 15-18.)

Bowers also testified that she paid Salt Lake County

regarding the Salt Lake County Certificate of Non-Compliance for cleanup of the
Property. (R. 60; T. 34-35.) Bowers also repeatedly testified that she did not
understand there were encumbrances on the title to the Property at the time she
purchased it, nor did she understand at any given time whether or not she had clear
title to the Property, even at trial. (T. 11-13,18-19, 26-27, 44, 47, 53-54, 58-59.)
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Knighton testified that after entering into the Agreement with Bowers, he
researched the title of the Property. (T. 66.) He learned that there were three
defects to the title of the Property: the Frampton Trust Deed, the AMTRA Trust
Deed, and the Salt Lake County Certificate of Non-Compliance, noted as Exhibit
Nos. 5, 6, and 7 at trial. (T. 67; Trial Ex. Nos. 5-7.) Knighton testified during trial
that he was still willing to purchase the Property under the terms of the Agreement,
even if there might be any other undisclosed defects in the title to the Property. (T.
88-89.)
Relying on this evidence and no other, the court held that because Bowers
does not have clear title, the trial court did "not believe that Ms. Bowers can perform
today." (T. 178.) The court further held in denying Knighton specific performance
that it would "not require the defendant to deliver title to the plaintiff, even if she
could, which I don't think she can." (T. 181.) These factual holdings by the court
are not supported by any evidence as noted above. Even though Bowers did not
have a very clear understanding as to defects in the title of the Property at any
given time during the length of the dispute or at trial, she presented no evidence of
additional defects in the title to the Property other than the three items discovered
by Knighton during his due diligence review of the title of the Property (the
Frampton Trust Deed, the AMTRA Trust Deed, and the Salt Lake County Certificate
of Non-Compliance) which were all satisfied by Bowers prior to trial, as established
by her own testimony. (R. 60; T. 30-31, 34-35.) It is undisputed that she cured
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these defects in title, and there was no evidence of any other defects presented at
trial. The trial court's finding that Bowers did not have clear title at the time of trial
is against the clear weight of the evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. This
Court should overturn the trial court's holding and grant Knighton specific
performance. Even if there are still defects in the title to the Property, pursuant to
Kelley. Knighton is still entitled to specific performance of the Agreement. Because
no evidence was presented regarding any lingering defects in title to the Property,
there would be no abatement in the purchase price pursuant to Kelley. Kelley at fl
1242.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING LOST-RENT DAMAGES
TO KNIGHTON.
The trial court erred in denying Knighton lost-rent damages in this matter.

The trial court ruled from the bench in response to counsel for Knighton's request
that the trial speak to the issue of lost-rent damages as follows:
I intentionally have not. I just can't find anything here that would
suggest that there's any lost rents or damages in that regard on the
part of either party. Again, I'm satisfied that any lost rents occurred
after, I think, a breach had been declared in December of 1996. So
there is no - neither party's claimed for loss of rents and I just can't
find any basis for damages either way there. Any set offs or additions.
(T. 184-85.)
A trial court's decision to award damages is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 31, U 6,973 P.2d 445.
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A.

In Addition to Specific Performance, Knighton is Entitled to Lost-Rent
Damages.
In addition to specific performance, Knighton is entitled to lost-rent damages

in this matter. When specific performance is in order, "the buyer may be entitled
to an award of lost rents or profits, while the seller may be entitled to interest on the
purchase money withheld by the purchaser." Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 431
(Utah 1980) (citations omitted). A seller is only entitled to "actual interest earned
on the purchase money retained by the purchaser, if any." \± (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
In the case at hand, Knighton testified that he had successfully leased the
Property to a third party for $200 per month, commencing April of 1996. (T. 11920.) He was thwarted in his efforts to complete the rental of the Property due to
Bowers' breach of the Agreement. (T. 178-79.) In addition, Bowers testified that
she had been paying $360 per month for lot rental elsewhere when she moved her
mobile home on to the Property. (T. 41.) Knighton placed the payments he
withheld form Bowers in a non-interest bearing escrow account. (Trial Ex. No. 27.)
Knighton is entitled to specific performance of the Agreement and lost-rent
damages pursuant to Eliason. Furthermore, Bowers is not entitled to interest on the
installment payments placed by Knighton into the escrow account because it was
a non-interest bearing account so there is no "actual interest" as required for an
award of such interest pursuant to Eliason. (Trial Ex. No. 27.) ig\ at 431. This
matter should be remanded to the trial court to grant Knighton specific performance
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and augment the amount of judgment in the amount of lost rents accruing from
January 1997, when the Property was improved sufficiently to allow a mobile home
to be installed pursuant to the West Valley City inspection, until the date of trial in
the amount of $200 per month. (Trial Ex. No. 36.)
B.

Alternatively, Knighton's Damages Should be Increased by his LostRent Damages.
Should this Court deny Knighton specific performance of the Agreement,

Knighton should still be awarded lost-rent damages in this matter. In awarding
damages for breach of contract, courts attempt to place the nonbreaching party in
as good a position as if the contract had been performed. Saunders v. Sharp. 840
P.2d 796, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).
In the case at hand, Knighton testified that he had successfully leased the
Property to a third party for $200 per month. (T. 119-20.) He was thwarted in his
efforts to complete the rental of the Property due to Bowers' breach of the
Agreement when he had improved the Property sufficiently to install a mobile home
in January 1997. (T. 178-79; Trial Ex. No. 36.) In addition, Bowers testified that
she had been paying $360 per month for lot rental elsewhere when she moved her
mobile on to the Property. (T. 41.) Should this Court concur with the trial court that
Knighton is entitled to damages rather than specific performance, he is entitled to
damages that would put him in the same position had Bowers not breached the
Agreement. i d Knighton should therefore also be awarded lost-rent damages in
the amount of $200 per month from January 1997, when the Property was improved
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sufficiently to allow a mobile home to be installed pursuant to the West Valley City
inspection, to the date of trial. (R. 58; T. 41, 147; Trial Ex. No. 36.) Should this
Court deny Knighton specific performance, this matter should be remanded to the
trial court to augment the amount of judgment in the amount of lost rents accruing
from January 1997, when the Property was improved sufficiently to allow a mobile
home to be installed, until the date of trial in the amount of $200 per month.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for
award of specific performance of the Agreement, transferring title of the Property
to Knighton, award of lost rents accruing from January 1997 to the date of trial, and
an award of Appellant's costs in successfully prevailing against Appellee, both at
trial and on appeal. In the alternative, this Court should remand this matter to the
trial court to augment the amount of judgment in the amount of lost rents caused
Knighton accruing from January 1997 to the date of trial and an award of
Appellant's costs in successfully prevailing against Appellee, both at trial and on
appeal.
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DATED this

IX

day of July, 2003

DENNIS K. POOLE
JOHN L. ADAMS
POOLE & ADAMS, L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following
this

of July, 2003:

Stephen J. Buhler
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 245
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone (801) 964-6901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

'
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ADDENDA
Addendum "A"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Addendum"B"
Dean v. Gregg. 34 Wash. App. 684, 663 P.2d 502 (1983)
Addendum "C"
Trial Exhibit No. 19, Letter Dated December 21, 1997
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
POOLE & ADAMS, LC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)263-3344
Telecopier: (801)263-1010
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KERRY L. KNIGHTON,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

CIVIL NO. 000909408
VICKEY A. BOWERS,
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 4th day of December, 2002. The Court,
having received evidence and argument of the parties and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties entered into an agreement on December 22,1995, whereby the

defendant agreed to sell and the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property subject to
certain conditions, including Plaintiff's due diligence (Exhibit 2).
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2.

The terms of the agreement included a price for the property of $15,000, with

a down payment and deferred payments payable to the Defendant Seller.
3.

The parties agreed that the Plaintiff would pay the Defendant $200.00 per

month which would be applied to the price of the property and would be forfeited only if
later the Plaintiff decided not to buy the property.
4.

In signing the December 22, 1996 agreement, the Defendant represented

that she had clear title to the property.
5.

The Defendant did not, in fact, have clear title to the property but she should

have known that she did not have clear title before entering in to the agreement with the
Plaintiff, based upon the deed that she received on the property.
6.

The parties entered into a subsequent agreement on April 19, 1996, which

was entered into after the Plaintiff discovered problems with Defendant's title and after
he informed Defendant of those problems, specifically the existence of two trust deeds
(Exhibits 5 and 6) and one Certificate of Non-Compliance (Exhibit 7).
7.

The April 19, 1996 agreement was executed as an extension of the

December 22, 1995 agreement, adding that closing would be within thirty (30) days of
Defendant clearing title, in anticipation that the liens would be removed within a short time.
This agreement also permitted Plaintiff to move his mobile home to the property.
8.

The liens were not timely removed by Defendant as anticipated in April 1996.

9.

By December 1996, the Plaintiff was rightfully concerned about the money

he had been paying to Defendant with the risk of never getting the property.
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10.

In December 1996, the Plaintiff stopped paying the Defendant directly and

unilaterally started putting the $200 monthly payment in escrow. The Defendant did not
object to this procedure.
11.

It was reasonable for Plaintiff to protect himself from Defendant's breach by

placing the money in escrow until such time as clear title could be provided.
12.

Following December 1996, the property was scheduled for a trustee's sale

by the trust deed holder of the property. The Defendant paid $4,899.50 on February 11,
1998, to save the property from the trustee's sale and to obtain a release of the two trust
deeds.
13.

After paying the money to obtain the release of the trust deeds, the

Defendant decided she had too much time and money invested into the property to sell it
to the Plaintiff for the agreed-to sales price of $15,000.00.
14.

The Defendant also paid off the lien in favor of Salt Lake County for the

Certificate of Non-Compliance.
15.

Defendant had her attorneys write letter to the Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff

had not performed on the contract, which statements were not true.
16.

Defendant did not advise Plaintiff of the release of the trust deeds or the

payment of the liens in favor of Salt Lake County.
17.

The Plaintiff never prepared closing papers or tendered the payments directly

to Defendant because the Defendant was not prepared to close.
18.
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19.

There is no evidence that the Plaintiff could not perform under the contract

if Defendant had performed by clearing the title.
20.

It is a non-special mobile home lot that is currently the Defendant's residence.

21.

Plaintiff knew in December 1996 that he could not likely get the property and

could have then declared a breach and sued for return on his money.
22.

Plaintiff paid the Defendant $200.00 per month for a total of thirteen (13)

months, which payments were to be applied against the purchase price.
23.

The Plaintiff continued to make deposits into escrow, such payments totaling

$12,400.00.
24.

The Plaintiff made improvements to the property when he moved his trailer

upon the property, which generally benefit the property as outlined in Exhibit 12, with the
exception of the $683.00 fence and the $500.00 deduction that the Plaintiff made on that
Exhibit, resulting in improvements to the property valued at $3,691.60.
25.

Plaintiff's last improvements were made on April 3, 1997.

26.

Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding loss of the benefit of his bargain.

27.

No other evidence was presented regarding the status of title to the property,

although Plaintiff indicated he would take the property in its current status
Based upon; the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The December 22, 1995 agreement, as extended by the April 19, 1996

agreement, is legally binding between the parties.
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2.

Prior to trial, Defendant resolved the title issues objected to by Plaintiff, but

the Defendant still may not have clear title to the property.
3.

The Plaintiff is entitled to recover for the Defendant's failure to obtain clear

4.

The Plaintiff, in hr pleadings, has asked for alternative remedies: (a)

title.

damages; and (b) specific performance.
5.

Where there is an adequate remedy11 at law, the Court should not resort to

6.

Specific performance is not required or preferred over monetary damages if

equity.

monetary damages are sufficient.
7.

There is nothing unique to the Plaintiff about the property at issue.

8.

Throi igl i» i 101 letai \ damages, there is an adequate remedy at law and specific

performance is not an appropriate remedy and should not be granted.
9.

The Court finds1

-

titt is entitled to njtjrinif-ni of $200.00 per month

for the thirteen (13) months of payments that he paid to the Defendant, even though the
first four (4) months, or $800 nil, wei e In hrli 1 Ihn pmpeily (I at I1 y w<jm still part n1 the
purchase price.
10.

The Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate on each

of these $200.00 payments until the judgment is entered, then post-judgment statutory
interest should accrue thereon.
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11.

The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment of $3,691.60 for the value of the

improvements made by the Plaintiff to the property, with prejudgnlent interest to accrue
thereon at the statutory rate from April 3, 1997, until the judgment is entered, then postjudgment statutory interest should accrue thereon.
12.

The Plaintiff is entitled to the return of monies deposited into escrow.

13.

The Plaintiff is entitled to Rule 54(d) costs of the filing fee and service of the

Complaint, which (--tMi! be added to lhtj |udcjn)«?nl
14.

Upon the judgment being paid by the Defendant, the Defendant is entitled

to the removal of Plaintiff's Notice of Interest which he has recorded agaii ist the pi opei ty.
15.

Neither party is entitled to an award of lost rents or damages which occurred

after the breach was declared in December 1996, except as specifically set forth above.
16.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amounts set forth in Schedule "A"

attached hereto.
'- FDthis jU

dayof JaniMiy, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

f'Mr+s^L^^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the almvo ami toreqoinu. FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW in Case No. 000909408 was mailed, postage
prepaid, United States Mail, the

h

day of January, 2003, to the following:

Stephen J. Buhler, Esq.
3540 South 400 West, Suite 245
West Valley City. Utah 84120
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KNIGHTON INTEREST CALCULATION

Payment
22-Dec-95
20-Jan-96
19-Feb-96
19-Mar-96
19-Apr-96
20-May-96
21-Jun-96
10-Jul-96
06-Aug-96
06-Sep-96
20-Oct-96
20-Nov-96
21-Dec-96
03-Apr-97

Column Totals

Amount
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$200.00
$3,691.60

Int. Rate
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%
10.00%

Days Elapsed
Interest Amt.
to Januaryl 0,2003
2586.00
$141.70
2547.00
$139.56
2517.00
$137.92
2488.00
$136.33
2457.00
$134.63
2426.00
$132.93
2395.00
$131.23
$130.14
2375.00
2348.00
$128.66
2317.00
$126.96
2273.00
$124.55
2242.00
$122.85
2211.00
$121.15
2108.00
$2,132.03

$6,291.60

Total Amount Due

$3,840.63
$10,132.23
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(Cite as: 34 Wash.App. 684, 663 P.2d 502)

C
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 2.
Leslie D. DEAN and Jose M. Dean, husband and
wife, Appellants,
v.
Burton M. GREGG, Respondent.
No. 5273-3-II.
May 18, 1983.

Purchasers of realty under a real estate purchase
and sale agreement appealed judgment entered by
the Superior Court, Clark County, John Skimas, J.,
awarding the monetary damages for seller's breach
of contract but denying them specific performance
of that contract. The Court of Appeals, Petrie, J.,
held that purchasers of realty were entitled to
specific performance.
Reversed.

West Headnotes
[1] Specific Performance €==>65
358k65 Most Cited Cases
Purchasers of realty were entitled to specific
performance of real estate purchase and sale
agreement, in that seller's failure to complete sale
was a most flagrant breach of contract, with his
excuse for nonperformance being simply that he
entered into a bad bargain.
[2] Specific Performance €^=>16
358kl6 Most Cited Cases
In absence of fraud, entering into a bad bargain is
not a sufficient reason to deny specific performance.
*685 **502 Hugh Knapp, Camas, for the Deans.
**503 Hugh Potter, Vancouver, for Gregg.

PETRIE, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Leslie D. Dean and Jose M. Dean,
purchasers of realty under a real estate purchase and
sale agreement with defendant, Burton M. Gregg,
seller, appeal a judgment awarding them monetary
damages for seller's breach of the contract but
denying them specific performance of that contract.
We reverse and direct specific performance in the
manner set forth herein.
The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact
adequately describe the nature of the controversy.
In June 1979 the parties executed a contract for the
purchase and sale of a portion of Lot 64 of a
previously recorded plat. The land in question,
identified by courses and distances from a fixed
point, was designated as Lot 4 of a proposed short
plat of said Lot 64 which Dr. Gregg had presented
to appropriate county officials and for which he had
received conditional, preliminary approval. The
contract provided, "This sale subject to property
being short platted into 4 parcels," and also
provided, "If either party defaults (that is, fails to
perform the acts required of him) in his contractual
performance herein, the non-defaulting party may
seek specific performance pursuant to the terms of
this agreement, damages, or rescission."
On the date set for closing, plaintiffs were ready,
willing and able to pay the purchase price in cash,
and they signed all documents requiring their
signatures. Defendant performed most of the acts
required of him preparatory to performing his
obligations under the contract. However, his costs
to complete the platting procedure increased beyond
his expectations. In anticipation of those costs
exceeding the amount to be realized on the sale of
Lot 4 of the plat, he arranged for a line of credit of
$25,000. [FN1] Nevertheless, those costs exceeded
the net sale expectation by $33,175.86.
FN1. He also testified that he had $4,000
available to assist financing the short plat.
*686 In his words, when "costs started mounting
up, I was becoming more and more concerned about
the advisability of cutting this property up for what
seemed to be a minimal economic return."
As a result, he asked his broker to contact the
Deans to see if they would purchase Lot 3 of the
same proposed short plat with a down payment of
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$15,000. They refused, and Dr. Gregg testified, "I
elected not to proceed."
The trial court expressly found that "The short plat
probably could have been completed in December
1979," had Dr. Gregg acquired legal title from his
vendors and release of a bank lien. Indeed, the
record indicates that he had substantially complied
with the conditions imposed by the preliminary
approval so that, upon presentation of the
appropriate documents signed by him as owner,
final approval would have been a ministerial act.
By the time trial was held, however, the
preliminary approval had lapsed. The trial court,
though finding the breach, nevertheless denied
specific performance because of (1) Dr. Gregg's
financial inability to complete the transaction
(despite the finding that the fair market value of the
remainder of the proposed plat was in excess of
$135,000), and (2) the court's lack of authority to
order final approval of the short plat.
[1][2] This court finds Dr. Gregg's failure to
complete this sale a most flagrant breach of
contract. Indeed, we find defendant's excuse for
nonperformance so woefully deficient that justice
demands reversal in this case. By his own
testimony Dr. Gregg simply concluded that he had
entered into a bad bargain. In the absence of fraud
(and none is charged in this case), that is not a
sufficient reason to deny specific performance.
The facts in the case at bench are sufficiently
similar to those in Egbert v. Way, 15 Wash.App. 76,
546 P.2d 1246 (1976), and Hudesman v. Foley, 4
Wash.App. 230, 480 P.2d 534 (1971), to warrant
reversal.

FN2. A short subdivision is not subject to
the restraints imposed by RCW 58.17.200
and .320. A short subdivision "shall
comply with the provisions of any local
regulation adopted pursuant to RCW
58.17.060." RCW 58.17.030. We note
that Section 17.03.020(H) of Clark County
Land Division Ordinance presently in
effect, which will govern Dr. Gregg's
renewed effort to obtain short plat
approval, specifically exempts "Divisions
of land made by Court Order" provided
that the division complies "with all the
provisions of Title 18, Clark County Code."

It is so ordered.

WORSWICK, Acting C.J., and REED, J, concur.
663 P.2d 502, 34 Wash.App. 684
END OF DOCUMENT

**504 The only complication is the fact that at this
late date Dr. Gregg will be required to refile his
application for approval of the short plat. We
direct that he do so, and *687 that he pursue it in
good faith under the supervision of the Superior
Court of Clark County. In the event the county,
despite Dr. Gregg's good faith efforts, should for
any reason fail to grant final approval of the short
plat after a reasonable time, the court is directed to
require Dr. Gregg to convey the property, together
with the easement specified in the contract, by
courses and distances set forth in the contract.
[FN2]
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MOAK LEGAL SERVICES
Post Office Box 1044
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
1-801-221-9004

N. Alan Moak, Attorney

December 21, 1997
Kerry L. Knighton
5890 South Kingston Way
Murray, Utah 84107
Re: Sale Lot 9 Kopperview
Dear Mr. Knighton:
My client is prepared to pay for having the water placed on lot 10 so that Paul Frampton will release
lot 9, and the sale to you can be concluded.
Please have your attorney contact me immediately relative to concluding this matter. As you know,
Metro title has scheduled a trustee sale for 12 February 1998.
Sincerely yours,

N. Alan Moak

